The article elaborates on the lack of objective guarantees of independence and impartiality in the existing system of investment treaty arbitration. This founds a case for an international investment court to replace the existing system. The argument proceeds in three steps: (1) investment treaty arbitration is uniquely a form of public law adjudication, constituted at the international level; (2) as constituted it does not satisfy standards of independence and impartiality in public law adjudication; and (3) various reasons that might be offered to justify this failing are unsatisfactory in light of the importance of these standards. For this reason, states should be encouraged to establish an international investment court in accordance with well-known principles of judicial decision-making. Above all, alternatives to the existing system should be measured against the criteria that typically apply in public law, especially the related principles of openness and independence. Absent these criteria being met, one does not have a system that depoliticizes disputes and subjects them to the rule of law, or that warrants the utmost respect of all parties, above all developing states.
This article presents a case for an international investment court. It is a case and not 'the case' because the argument is presented relative to existing arrangements that use a treaty-based arbitration mechanism to resolve investment disputes between states and investors. The argument is also narrow in that it focuses on a central distinction between judges and arbitrators: the secure tenure of the former and the insecure tenure (case-by-case appointment) of the latter. This orientation of the argument leads by implication to the assertion that there is something wanting in terms of the independence and impartiality of arbitrators in the existing arrangements based on investment treaty arbitration. Given this, the present case is meant to respond to a critical flaw in an existing arrangement for international adjudication by elaborating upon an alternative.
It should be made clear from the outset that apparent bias in investment treaty arbitration is just that: it is a reasonable suspicion of bias (not actual bias) arising from structural failings of arbitration when used to determine matters of public law. The critique of investment treaty arbitration should thus not be taken as a condemnation of anyone involved in investment arbitration; there are many jurists, lawyers, academics, and business people of skill and integrity who sit as arbitrators and whose reputation is not sullied by an objective critique of the structure of the system and, in particular, its lack of objective guarantees of independence and impartiality. The difficulty is that the current structure of investment treaty arbitration casts a pall over all awards, and all legal interpretations, that emerge from the system in spite of the experience, qualifications, integrity, etc of the arbitrators, for reasons quite unique to this system and not to others where arbitration is used.
Ultimately it does not have to be this way. There are alternatives that are superior in their guarantees of impartiality and independence and that can be achieved without legal or intellectual acrobatics, with benefits for most if not all of the actors involved including states and their governments, including investors (except perhaps for those investors for whom litigation is a business strategy in itself), and including other systems that rely properly on arbitration to resolve disputes, especially commercial arbitration. The clearest alternative to the present arrangement is to establish an international investment court.
The broad outline of the argument presented here in favour of such a court is as follows. First, investment treaty arbitration is a form of public law adjudication in which the meaning of public law is resolved finally by adjudication. Second, for this reason, it should be evaluated according to standards that apply historically in public law. Third, the current system's failure to satisfy these standards, especially security of tenure, calls for an institutional arrangement that does satisfy them. Lastly, various counter-arguments that have been offered or that might be offered in opposition to an international investment court, founded on the principle of security of tenure in public law adjudication, do not warrant maintaining investment treaty arbitration as an alternative to such a court. For this reason, states should be encouraged to establish an international investment court in accordance with well-known principles of judicial decision-making in public law.
A Underlying assumptions
The case presented here borrows and elaborates on arguments presented elsewhere by the author 1 and it remains grounded in the theoretical distinction between the use of arbitration to resolve regulatory disputes and its use to resolve commercial or other private disputes. There are powerful criticisms of public-private distinctions from various perspectives and the aim here is not to dismiss these, although in this paper the criticisms are not discussed in detail if at all. Rather, the aim here is to use the public-private distinction to elucidate specific differences in casting the major types of adjudication, while acknowledging the possibility that the distinction may leave gray areas or be simply inappropriate in some circumstances. Nevertheless, it is assumed that these limitations are not so pervasive or frequent in the present context as to defeat the underlying usefulness of the distinction.
The public-private distinction rests in turn on a concept of the state as sovereign.
This concept too has received some negative press of late. The argument here is again quite pragmatic in its orientation. It refers to sovereignty as an instrument for identifying and analyzing certain activities of states as activities that states alone are able to engage in; for example, the passage of general rules accepted as binding in society and ultimately enforceable by the state's coercive power. Recognizing this uniqueness of the state as sovereign, arising from its role as the representative of a political group associated with a particular territory, is useful in that it helps to reveal the distinctiveness of the relationship between the state and those who are subjected to or affected by regulatory activity of the state. As a concept, sovereignty is a means of social ordering that is important (though of course not beyond challenge or doubt)
and that has sufficient probative value here, it is suggested, to enable an elaboration of the sorts of disputes that arise between investors and states and how those disputes differ from disputes arising between parties that are equally capable of possessing legal rights and obligations.
In particular, an important aspect of disputes arising between a sovereign state and a foreign investor is that they are one-sided in that the entity on one side, the state, has a different set of powers and obligations in law than the entity on the other side, the investor. In some respects the state will possess rights that private parties cannot hold such that the state will have powers that are specifically sovereign. In other respects the state may be bound by sovereign obligations that a private party cannot possess or that a private party is in a unique position legally to avoid or abbreviate (by for example declaring bankruptcy). Where a dispute between a state and a private party occurs in relation to the state's exercise of these uniquely sovereign powers or its assumption of uniquely sovereign obligations, the dispute is described here as a 'regulatory dispute' and the adjudication of that dispute as a form of 'public law adjudication'.
Thus, for present purposes, the public-private distinction entails recognition of the state as an entity with unique characteristics and of this concept of the state as the basis for public law as a category of study, enabling (even if roughly or with doubt) a distinction between instances in which adjudication is used to resolve regulatory disputes and instance in which it is used to resolve disputes originating in a reciprocal relationship between juridical equals.
B Argument 1
Investment treaty arbitration as a form of public law adjudication
In applying this conceptual framework to investment treaty arbitration, the author has argued elsewhere (and will again only summarize that argument here) that investment treaty arbitration is a public law system, uniquely constituted at the international level, which replicates the structure of judicial review in domestic public law to a greater degree than other forms of international adjudication. In this respect, there is a key conceptual difference between investment treaty arbitration on the one hand and international commercial arbitration or conventional inter-state adjudication in public international law on the other. Both latter forms of international adjudication -international commercial arbitration and inter-state adjudication -are used to resolve disputes arising from a reciprocal legal relationship between the parties; that is, in international commercial arbitration, between private parties (one of which may be a state, acting in a private capacity) and in public international law between states (both acting in a sovereign capacity In the US context, Alexander Hamilton spoke in the Federalist Papers of the incorporation of security of tenure in the American Constitution in these terms: 5
As liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments; … [permanence in office] may therefore be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and, in great measure, as the citadel of the public justice and the public security.
Hamilton wrote further of the 'permanent tenure of judicial officers' that 'nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be Independence of the judiciary has normally been thought of as freedom from interference by the executive or legislature in the exercise of the judicial function…. In modern times, with the steady growth of corporate giants, it is of utmost importance that the independence of the judiciary from business or corporate interests should also be secured. In short, independence of the judiciary implies not only that a judge be free from governmental and political pressure and political entanglement but also that he should be removed from financial and business entanglements likely to affect, or rather to seem to affect him in the exercise of his judicial function.
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Perceived versus actual bias
How do those principles of judicial decision-making apply to investment treaty arbitration? In the first place, it is important to clarify that our concern is not merely actual bias but also the perception of bias on the part of the individual adjudicator or 6 ibid, 469. adjudicative body. I draw attention to this only because it has been said that, without proof of actual bias or an actual conflict of interest on the part of an arbitrator, there is no problem with the current system of investment treaty arbitration. To insist on proof actual bias, however, entails a diminished standard of impartiality and independence, not only in the context of public law, but also in other contexts where arbitration is commonly utilized to resolve disputes. For all forms of adjudication, if
we consider this a process by which a neutral authority that is not under the sway of one of the dispute parties, one speaks in terms of the absence of any 'apprehension' of bias, or any 'appearance' or 'suspicion' or 'danger' of bias, in order simply to make the point is that the concern for fairness and justice goes beyond actual bias and is measurable in terms of perceptions, based either on an objective standard or on subjective views of the parties themselves.
The Court of Appeal of England and Wales put it thus in the Locabail decision: 9
…. objections and applications based on what, in the case law, is called 'actual bias' are very rare, partly (as we trust) because the existence of actual bias is very rare, but partly for other reasons also. The proof of actual bias is very difficult, because the law does not countenance the questioning of a judge about extraneous influences affecting his mind; and the policy of the common law is to protect litigants who can discharge the lesser burden of showing a real danger of bias without requiring them to show that such bias actually exists.
So there are good reasons for not limiting the evaluation to proof of actual bias on the part of an adjudicator. First, it would be unreasonable to hold a party to a requirement to prove actual bias given the difficulties in doing so. Second, it would be unbecoming of the adjudicative process to require the adjudicator to testify in advance as to his or her state of mind, opinions, etc. Instead, one speaks of the perception of bias. In Lord Hewart's famous formulation: 'it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done'. 10 Or, according to the Supreme Court of Canada, it is required 'that the court or tribunal be reasonably perceived as independent': 11
The reason for this additional requirement was that the guarantee of judicial independence has the goal not only of ensuring that justice is done in individual cases, but also of ensuring public confidence in the justice system....
Also according to the Supreme Court of Canada: 12
Without that confidence the system cannot command the respect and acceptance that are essential to its effective operation. It is, therefore, important that a tribunal should be perceived as independent, as well as impartial, and that the test for independence should include that perception. Energy and Peru, and that Dr Tawil served concurrently as counsel in two other investment treaty cases against Argentina over which Dr Rigo Sureda had presided.
Thus, the concern was that Dr Sureda would be sitting in judgment of a client of Dr Tawil, while Dr Tawil was sitting in judgment of a client of Dr Riga Sureda's law firm.
This challenge was also rejected without reasons by the ICC International Court of Arbitration, which had been designated to hear the challenge by the appointing authority for the arbitration, the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
There have been other challenges to the appointment of arbitrators. With one exception, 14 they have not succeeded to my knowledge (although some are still pending) and it is not suggested here that any of them should have succeeded in any particular case. The point here is simply that this is an area of inquiry, applicable to courts and to arbitration tribunals, that concerns matters of perceived bias; the common question is whether there is some characteristic of the individual adjudicator that raises concerns. These objective guarantees are absent, obviously, from arbitration where the arbitrator is appointed on a case by case basis. Arbitrators who are appointed on a case by case basis by definition do not have security of tenure. But is this really a concern? If one holds investment treaty arbitration to the established standards of judicial independence and impartiality in public law then the answer is yes, because the absence of security of tenure leads to a reasonable judgment that the system is stacked, to put it crudely, in favour of investors and against host states. Undoubtedly, in any adjudicative system, parties on both sides will sometimes claim that they lost unjustifiably and that they did not get a fair hearing. However, uniquely in the case of the present system because of its use of arbitration in public law, a perception of bias does operate structurally in favour of investors and against states and those on whose behalf states act.
There are two elements to this. The first has to do with the designation under investment treaties of appointing authorities for arbitrators. Without security of tenure for the adjudicator, the entity that has the ultimate power to appoint in each case, after a claim has been filed, has much greater ability to influence the adjudicative process than if it only appointed the adjudicator once and for a set term. In a case by case system, the appointing authority has the power to choose the presiding arbitrator, in the absence of agreement between the state and individual, after examining in each instance the dispute at hand, the nationality of the claimant, the identify of the host state, and so on. Under investment treaties, this power is allocated to decision-makers that cannot be said to be reasonably free from bias in favour of International Court of Arbitration, the members of which are nominated by the ICC world council of business on the recommendation of the ICC Executive Board. 19 On its website, the ICC describes itself as 'the world business organization', as 'the voice of world business', and as an organization that 'speaks for world business whenever governments make decisions that crucially affect corporate strategies and the bottom line'. This conveys simply the point that the ICC is an association of businesses that represents the interests of its members, many of whom are foreign investors, and that can therefore be reasonably regarded as disposed more toward the business interests of investors than the regulatory priorities of states.
Indeed, it seems far-fetched to suggest that a business organization (or an adjudicative body the members of which are appointed by a business organization)
can serve as a neutral appointing authority, where it has the authority to appoint arbitrators to resolve regulatory disputes between states and business. It is doubtful that such an arrangement would ever be accepted in a domestic context. Can one imagine a claim of 'unfair regulation', brought by a company, being submitted for resolution by an ad hoc tribunal, the president of which was appointed by the local chamber of commerce? Not if one expected the claim to be resolved in a way that was regarded as credible by outsiders. Such an arrangement would appear rather as one meant to favour the business interest at the expense of genuine independence and impartiality.
The second element of this question of impartiality and independence -beyond the role of the appointing authority -is that security of tenure also insulates the adjudicator from influence by powerful private interests, so as to ensure that no one can say that the judge was predisposed to decide a case or interpreted the law in a way that would increase his or her prospects for future income and career advancement.
Here it can be said (even where it is not the case) that arbitrators may be seen to interpret the treaties in ways that encourage claims by investors and, in turn, allows the relevant arbitration industry to thrive. That concern is unique to investment treaty arbitration, where the private model of arbitration is imported into the realm of public law, because only one class of parties (here the investor) activates the system by bringing a claim under the treaty.
WR Lederman wrote in 1976 that with the security of tenure of judges, 'The conditions on which they hold office mean that they have no personal career interest to be served by the way they go in deciding cases that come before them.' 20 This removal of the career interest from the adjudicative equation is defeated when one assigns appointing authority on a case by case basis to executive officials; in the words of Lord Denning, without security of tenure, 'The judicial power is simply a part of the executive machine'. 21 It is likewise defeated when security of tenure is removed in a one-way system in which only one class of disputing parties triggers use of the system. 20 Lederman, above n 3, 11. 21 Denning, above n 4, 1.
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Thus, to retrace our steps, the underlying distinction between regulatory and reciprocal legal relationships is important because it suggests that public law disputes, and especially matters of law arising from such disputes, should not be left ultimately to arbitrators to resolve. Rather, they should be subject to the overarching authority of public courts, defined among other things by their presumptive openness and by objective guarantees of their independence and impartiality, in order to guard against the suspicion that the adjudicator has been swayed in their judgments by the power that others hold over his or her income and career. The argument is grounded in the importance of security of tenure to the evolution of an adjudicative system that can earn the utmost respect by all those whose rights or interests are engaged, above all those who are directly subject to its authority and who may be affected detrimentally by its outcomes.
Reply to counter-arguments
Certain counter-arguments have been advanced, and others may be anticipated, to this case for an international investment court. Most commonly in my experience it has been argued that there is no proof of actual bias in investment treaty arbitration and therefore no problem with the current system. Absent evidence or some case of actual bias, it is said, the requirements of independence and impartiality are satisfied.
This counter-argument rests on a misconception not only of the standards of independence and impartiality that apply to judging in public law, but also of those that apply in other adjudicative contexts, including commercial arbitration. 22 As discussed above, it is not usually a requirement in adjudication that actual bias be shown in order to disqualify an adjudicator from a particular case ( to require the foreign investor to show otherwise as a precondition of an investment treaty claim (or perhaps to reverse the presumption by at least allowing the host state to defend itself against a treaty claim by establishing the independence of its courts).
Where the duty to exhaust local remedies is removed, the preference for international arbitration operates not only as a mechanism to address failings of domestic courts but also as a means to privilege foreign investors by allowing them to evade judicial authority in public law, no matter how independent and capable of delivering justice the courts may be. Lastly, even if the duty to exhaust local remedies is removed, the more appropriate alternative to domestic courts -if one's aim is to limit political control over the resolution of investment disputes and subject them instead to the rule of law -is patently an international investment court, not a system based on case-by-case adjudicative appointment by executive or private business officials in a regulatory context that encourages arbitrators to adopt interpretations in favour of investors so as to encourage future claims.
Another counter-argument might be to point to administrative or quasi-judicial tribunals at the domestic level that are staffed by adjudicators who do not have secure tenure, but that resolve claims brought by individuals against the state in response to legislative or executive decisions. In domestic administrative law, it is sometimes said that judicial standards of independence must be moderated in order to facilitate the fair and expeditious adjudication of disputes about individual interests in the modern administrative state. That is, the state is simply so vast and complex that the machinery of government would seize up if all governmental decisions that affected an individual were subject to review by a fully independent court.
The author should confess that he is one who tends to emphasize the importance of maintaining conventional standards of judicial independence as much as possible, and of funding the courts accordingly, when dealing with even highly specific decisions of governments that affect an individual in a particularized way. Yet there is no need to Presumably, the priority is not to save several tens of millions of dollars a year, but to establish a system that is widely regarded as fair and independent, in the longer term interest of the system and those whom it seeks to protect.
Second, one is not dealing in investment treaty arbitration with the sorts of questions that are allocated to administrative tribunals in domestic law. The disputes at stake do not involve the removal of a liquor license or the disciplining of a lawyer or a doctor.
Rather, they very often address the legality of legislative acts or broad policy decisions of government, leading to the potential re-allocation of substantial public funds to private business. These questions are of a different order of significance from those usually resolved by domestic tribunals. It is also noteworthy that domestic tribunals, even when they handle large numbers of claims, are often staffed by members who have a set tenure and who are not assigned on a case-by-case basis at the pleasure of the executive. As such, the standard of independence and impartiality that is offered by many domestic tribunals, although they deal with less weighty matters, surpasses that of investment treaty tribunals.
Third, and most importantly, where a decision of a domestic tribunal does engage important questions of general law, the decision can be appealed to an independent court. This is not the case in investment treaty arbitration, where questions of law decided by arbitrators are not subject to review in a court, whether domestic or international, to assure their correctness or reasonableness.
There are of course other possible counter-arguments. One might argue that, if adjudicators under investment treaties were required to commit to a lengthy term of service, states would not be able to attract those with the desired experience or expertise. This is not a flippant objection and one should not underestimate the challenge of identifying the best possible candidates for such an important role as membership on an international investment court. However, considering the willingness of many prominent judges, practitioners, academics, and officials to accept appointments as arbitrators in the present system, it seems doubtful that one would face a shortage of highly qualified persons who were willing to serve, even if it required them to relinquish income or career opportunities elsewhere. Some would no doubt decline the opportunity for very understandable reasons, but there would likely be others to take their place, and they should at least be invited to step forward.
Finally, the system might benefit from widening the pool of recruitment by drawing on persons with experience and expertise in fields of law and policy beyond those of international investment or commerce, in light of the breadth of issues that may be generated by regulatory disputes between business and state.
Another counter-argument might be that the parties should be permitted to choose an adjudicator or adjudicative process that they believe will better serve to deal with disputes between them. That is a compelling argument in many contexts where arbitration is used, as in commercial arbitration, labour arbitration, and perhaps family arbitration. But in the case of investment treaty arbitration it runs into the first stage of the case presented here. Regulatory disputes between states and investors are not disputes between juridical equals. They are a matter of public law, where the fictional behemoth of the sovereign state has myriad relations with all private parties within its jurisdiction and affected by its governing choices, and where it is up to the institutions of the state to decide on the forms of decision-making and adjudication that will be made accessible to individuals who wish to challenge the sovereign. In this context, it is more accurate to say that the state (or states, by treaty) authorized a particular form of dispute settlement that the individual subsequently opts to take advantage of, as where a person brings a claim against the state under a domestic statute or constitution. To reduce such arrangements for public law adjudication to the conceptual framework of a consensual agreement between disputing partiesgiven the singular and over-arching role of the state's decision to establish the arrangements as a means to govern the state's regulatory authority -is artificial.
Along the same lines, it was recently put to the author, following a conference presentation, that ICSID plays a limited role as an appointing authority because it appoints the presiding arbitrator in just 3% of cases. I confess to not knowing the frequency of actual appointments as a proportion of potential appointments by ICSID. It is firstly not a straightforward figure to calculate. Does one measure ICSID appointments as a proportion of all presiding arbitrators who take part in arbitrations that are subject to ICSID appointing authority, for example? Or does one measure ICSID appointments as a proportion of all appointments in such arbitrations, including appointments of the party-appointed arbitrators? A further complication is that awards do not always indicate in the text whether the presiding arbitrator was appointed by ICSID in the exercise of its compulsory power, or by some other means.
However, the author tested the figure of 3% in a preliminary way by reviewing investment treaty awards, decided before 1 September 2006, on which the relevant data was at hand (ie a statement in the award indicating who appointed the presiding arbitrator). This yielded these results. Of 26 cases reviewed, 25 16 were pursuant to the ICSID Rules, and ICSID appointed the presiding arbitrator in 69% of those cases.
The other 10 cases were pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules, and the designated appointing authority (ICSID in 9 of the 10 cases; Stockholm Chamber of Commerce in the remaining case) appointed the presiding arbitrator in 40% of those cases. Thus, even adopting assumptions that understate the role of the appointing authority -by excluding annulment committees (as did the author in gathering the 26 cases), by including party-appointed arbitrators in the calculation, and by assuming that all party-appointed arbitrators were in fact appointed by the relevant party although in fact they were in a few cases appointed by the appointing authority -then the result is that ICSID appointed 23% of total arbitrators in ICSID cases, and the designated appointing authority appointed 19% in ICSID and UNCITRAL cases combined. On these assumptions and preliminary findings, the figure of 3% appears a significant underestimate.
Regardless of the frequency of ICSID appointments, a more important point is that the power of an organization to appoint arbitrators goes beyond the actual exercise of that appointing authority. Negotiations between the disputing parties about who they should agree to appoint as president of a tribunal are shaped by their estimation of how the designated authority will exercise its power to appoint if called upon to do so. The appointing authority also normally has the power to resolve claims that a A final argument might be to plead a fait d'accompli by arguing that states have made the choice to use arbitration in this manner, and that is it. This is a profoundly powerful case where the objective is to interpret and apply the law as it stands. There may be constitutional limits to the delegation of judicial power to private arbitrators in some states, and the fact that states have resorted to arbitration to resolve public law may have implications for the system more broadly, perhaps in terms of the recognition and enforcement of awards. But there can be little, if any, doubt that the states parties to investment treaties intended to allow arbitrators who do not have secure tenure to resolve the relevant disputes. Nevertheless, this does nothing to undermine the argument presented here given that its object is to explain why states should not have made, and should not continue to make, this choice. The existing arrangement does not satisfy standards of judicial impartiality and independence; this inadequacy can be addressed by establishing an adjudicative body that satisfies those standards. It is quite clear at this stage what states did; the point is they got it wrong.
Some of these counter-arguments (and there are no doubt others not canvassed here)
are more compelling than others, but none warrants abandonment of the case for an international investment court. None explains in particular why it is preferable to use arbitration to resolve investment disputes rather than to ensure the utmost integrity of adjudicative decision-making in the regulatory domain by incorporating objective guarantees for judicial independence and impartiality.
C Conclusion
The skeletal argument presented here is (1) that investment treaty arbitration is a form of public law adjudication, (2) that it fails to satisfy standards of independence and impartiality in public law, and (3) that various reasons that might be offered to justify this are unsatisfactory in light of the importance of these standards. The next step is to ask: what sort of international investment court is required and how best should one seek to establish it? There are many possibilities and opportunities. An international investment court could be multilateral, regional, or bilateral. It could be a full court or an appellate body court that would hear appeals from decisions made in the first instance by arbitrators. It could be an autonomous entity or housed within existing institutions. It could be staffed by dedicated judges or via a roster of jurists who sit on domestic courts. Ultimately, it is not so important to arrive at a specific design for an international investment court that suits all states or all commentators.
Much more important is to recognize that the present system is flawed and call upon states to address this flaw. Ideally, states will act jointly to do so but to the extent that cooperation proves elusive, like-minded states should not hesitate to pursue alternatives to investment treaty arbitration with respect to their own treaty networks.
The critical point is that alternatives should be measured against the criteria of judging in public law, especially the related concepts of openness and independence.
Without these standards being met, one does not have a system that depoliticizes disputes and subjects them to the rule of law, or that deserves the respect of all interested parties, above all developing states. At present, when Argentina or Ecuador or the Czech Republic is unsuccessful in an investment treaty arbitration, its government and people have justifiable reason to reject the result as unfair, the process as structured unfairly against the host state, and the award as inferior in legitimacy to that of a court decision.
There is clearly an important role for arbitration in contexts outside of public law, where the concerns elaborated here are much less pertinent. There is also a need for international adjudication to address concerns arising from domestic regulation of foreign investment in a global economy and the threat of arbitrary or discriminatory treatment by host governments. In this respect, it would be beneficial for investors in general, as well as states, to establish a system that is widely regarded to be free of perceived bias. And regardless of one's views about whether there is a sufficient basis for doubts about the integrity of decisions emanating from the current system, why risk the possibility of many believing this to be the case? There is a clear alternative that is achievable, with awareness and political will, and states should be encouraged to pursue it.
Lastly it is important to reiterate that the argument here is not an indictment of I am not suggesting in any way that there has ever been any impropriety, either on the part of temporary sheriffs or on the part of any holder of any ministerial office, or of their officials. But I would add that if a judge is not independent, then however great his integrity, it may be very difficult for him to know whether his want of independence affects the way in which he carries out his judicial duties. And however determined a minister or public servant may be to carry out his functions in relation to the judiciary only on the basis of wholly appropriate considerations, it will be important for him to remember that his own confidence in his own integrity is not, and cannot be regarded as, a guarantee.
It is with the same sentiment that a case for an international investment court is laid out here. 
